It has long been believed that the establishment of the free banking laws was a move by state legislatures to provide greater access to the bank market and to increase bank competition. Kenneth Ng (1988) challenged the legislative approval system of bank chartering enhanced competition. Ng point outs that in states that enacted free banking laws, such as Massachusetts, Vermont, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, few free banks actually entered after the introduction of the free banking laws.
This inactivity suggests that some of the provisions of the new laws may have precluded easier entry. In addition to those free banking stats that showed little free banking, Ng finds the relative growth rates of the bank assets in free banking states were not significantly different from those of the region or the nation. He concludes that "the absence of unusual growth in free banking states suggests that free banking laws exchange one set of barriers contained in the legislative charter system for a different, but equally effective barriers." 1 The use of the relative growth rates, however, does not necessarily show a change in barriers to entry for two crucial reasons. First, the use of the relative growth rates of bank assets to estimate entry fails to distinguish between barriers to new entry and barriers to scale economies. A banking system's assets could increase without new entry if all banks in the system increased financial leverage or if the existing banks increased the level of retain earnings. In the short run, chartering states could have competed with the free banking states while still having significant barriers to entry a nd barrie r s to scale economi es . A banking s y stem's assets coul d increase without n e w e n try i f al l banks in the sys tem increased fi n ancial l everage or if t h e e xisting banks increas e d t he level of re tained earnings.
In the s hort run, chartering stat es could have competed with t h e free banking s tat e s whil e sti ll h aving signi ficant barriers to new e n try if the ir growth r a tes were att ribute d t o scale economies. Cons equentl y relative growth rat es in bank assets could be similar in free banking and c h arte ring states.
Second, as Ng pointed out, t h e enac t ment of the free banking laws may h ave had interst at e affec ts . 2 The fre e banking l aws ma y h a ve induced c h arte ring states to libe ra lize thei r c h art e ring pol icies . Thus, t h e free b a nking l a ws may h a v e induc e d t h e nonfr ee banking states' legislatures to institute a dif ferent c har t ering p o l icy de s igned t o increase t h e nu mber of char t.e rs. 3 This p aper reexamines t he i mpact of the free banking l a ws on barrie rs to e n try in both c harte r and free banking states before a nd after enac t men t. We include the a n a l y s i s t h e effec ts of econ omi es of scale on e n try a nd t h e c h a nge in c hartering polici e s 2 Ng (1 9 89) footno t e 18, page 888.
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Bodenhorn (1 990) exami nes the e n try issue t h rough inte rfirm rivalry and concluded t h a t t:t.te free banking l a ws h ad a . .
positive affect on competition through the 11 i nc reasi n g possibility of e n t ry and the number of potential e nt rants . .. 11 • His study examined six city mark ets. Our study takes a st ronge r posi t i on that free banking laws actually lowered barriers to entry.
3 of c h artering s ta tes. In the next sec t ion, a brief r e view of ent ry policy a nd activity is given . In Section I II, a competitive mo d el o f bank e nt r y is prese nted . In Se ction IV, a description of the data and the estimation p ro cedures for cros ss ectional -time serie s da t a a r e give n.
In Sections v a nd VI we test capi tal formation a nd bank entry, repec t ive ly , to examine differenc e s in en t ry be tween a l tern ative state bank i ng syste ms.
II) Banking Entry During the Anteb ellum Period
During t h e first part of the 19 t h century, s t ate charters we r e ind i vidually con structed and issued by t h e s tat e l egislatures .
In 18 2 8 the New York State l egislature e n act e d a g e n e ral banking l a w t hat s e t uniform regulat ions for all bank s that received legi s lative approval . This legislative approval was abandoned in 1838 with t h e e n ac t me n t of a free banking law . Th e free banki ng r e forms appear to h ave come in two distinct wave s : 18 3 7 -1845 and 18 5 0 -185 3 . In the first wave , four s tat e s e n a cted some fo rm of free banking legi s l at ion: Michigan, Ne w York, Georgia, and Ohio. Be tween 1850 and 1853, el e v e n more s tat e s e nacted f r ee banking laws and, by 1860, seventeen of t we nty -seve n a n tebe l lum state s followed New York's lead by e limina ting leg i sl ative approval and e n acting free banking l a ws . In t h e south, South Carolina issued 6 n e w charters during the three -year window (a 42% increase ) , but this is all t h ey allowed up to 1860 . Kentucky and Nor t h Carolina both showed modest increases between 1851 and 1854, but showed signific a nt entry thereaf ter; the number of banks in Kentucky more t r1an doubled whereas North Carolina had over a 50% increase in charters.
Althou gh Table 1 indica tes that entry activity increased across mos t states , i t is not clear whether t h e free banking states were better able to accommodat e the d e mand for banking capital and facilit s than the char te ring states . A reexamination of the period usi ng a bank entry mode l is informative.
III. Bank Entry Model
Capital formation in the banking marke t can come from two sources, internally generated capital from existing banks or 6 Virginia House of Dele~;iates Minority :Report from the Committee on Banks, 1853 · -54, Document No. 60, page 4 . 6 externally gen erated capital from new e n tran ts . For t hose operating under a free banking system, there were no restrictions on eith er source of entry, except t h e requirement that all new entrants maintain a minimum capital level .
In t h e non·-free banking states bot h sourc es of entry were regulated.
Legislatures restrict e d c h arters a nd t hose t h at received c harters were required to operate wi t hin a r ansJe of capital leve l s or at a specif ic capital level.
Charter b a nk s at the uppe r end of their regula tory capital requirements would h ave to seek legislative approval for any increase . To e valuate t h ese l egis lative barriers , we develop a c ompetitiv e model of capital formatio n and net e n try. Th e focus of t h is sec tion is to develop a capital formation model and a model t h at examines n e w bank e n try.
Capital Formation
Pe lt zman (196 5,19 70) , Throop (197 5 ) and Dwyer (198 Dwyer includes the level of bank capi tal relat i ve to alternative e mployme n ts, a nd the rat e of re turn on commodit s in his model . Data for these variables were n ot a vailable and were 7 FRit'),
whe re t h e expected sign of the parti al derivative i s given above each variable.
The desired stoc k s upply of capi tal varies directly wi th the rate of return in banki ng, and var i es inverse ly with the rate of return on a l te rnative fi n ancia l investment opportun i t ies.
Dwyer, as well as Peltzrnan, argue s that failur es s hould h ave a negative impact on bank capital formation. Two reasons are given for t he ne ga t i v e relation s hip: 11 fir st a h iqh fa ilure rate of existing banks should reflect market conditions making failure more probable for c u rren tly e s tblished (or establishing)
institutions; second, t he te nde ncy of bank f a i l ures to cause a 'run' o n existing institutions is stronger the more general are bank fail u res . ire Bo t h cond i t ion s woul d i ndi cate a n increase in risk to entrep re n eurs current ly in banking (and to tho se who plan to e n te r) and a decrease in t h e willingness to supply cap ital to t h e market.
The desired stock demand for bank capital , depe nd s inversely on the bank's cos t of directly on t h e level of deposits and banknotes (net of specie) and on regional bankno t es a nd deposits (DR 1 1:l :
no t inc luded in the model.
B
Peltzman (1965 , p . 32 ) 8 Capital is an input for the production of assets . As the cost of bank capital de clines, the bank wil l d e mand more capital to fi n a nc e the ir assets .
In t he abs e nce of federa l depos insurance, bank depositors demand bank capital as a cushion a g ai nst possible loss . 9 Since bank creditors are concern about potential l os ses , the appropriate measure of risk of loss would be the bank liabilities less specie.
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Foreign currency was banknotes circulating within one state that were i ssu ed by a bank from another state. In general, for eign .,.,
banknot es circulated at a di sc ount . Gordon (1991) found that t his discount reflected the transaction cost s of r e turning the bankno te to t h e issuing bank and a slight risk premium. If n eighboring state s allowe d their money supply to increase by increasing the 9 curre ncy, i n -state bankers would demand bank capital for the purpose of r easi ng currency circulation or reducing the rela t ive risk. Thus, regiona l d eposits wou ld h ave a posi tive effect on in -state capital if the in -state sys t em could not mee t in ·-s t a t e demand.
Equating equ ation (2) to (1) .
Entry of capital wi t h in a state occurs when the actual stock of capital deviates from t h e desired stoc k of cap ital . Thus , the actual rat e of c h a nge of capital per unit of t ime for state j is
where l n C' Jt denotes t h e l ogari t r1m of t he de sired flrn...r for bank c a pital and L denotes t h e coefficient of adjustment. Assuming state's banking capital, we woul d expect t hat t h e s k pre mium on foreign banknotes would remain con stant . The increa se in for e ign banknote s coul d be redeemed by -state bank s as lon g as they had a dequate supply of capital t o bac k t h e new issue. If t h ere was a s h ortage of capital , in-s ta te bank s coul d increase the discount rate whi c h would i n c r ease the circu l at ion o f foreign bankno tes .
._,
Thus, e v en when we con s ider the adj ustme nt in discoun t rates, we would e xp ect in -states banlcs to d e ma nd more banking capital as foreign currency increases .
the desired flow of capital equals the ac tual flow and sub sti t uting equ a t ion (3 ) i n t o equ a ti on (4) ,
For t his study , we are also con ce r ned with the entry of new bank s wi t hin a state. 11 By defini tion, ban k capital per bank for t h e jth state in time period t (Sjt ) is equal to total capital (Cj 1 J divided by t:h.e tota l number of bank s (Bjt ) :
Th e rate of change in the nu mber o:E banks can be found by differe ntiating equation (6) with respect to time,
By defini tion, t r1e r at e of change in the n urnber of banks l ' C:'
,, equal to t he rate of net entry (NER)
where E is the entry rate, M is the me rger rate, and X is the exit rate. 12 Th us, equat ion ( 7) states that the n et e n t ry rate i n the market wi ll increase wit h the pe rcentage increase capital, h ol ding average capital size constant, and will de crease a s banks in the market increase capital stock.
Su bs tituting 11
The fo ll owing section follows the l ead of Peltz man (1965) .
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Du ring the antebellum period mergers were rarely occured .
The historical record is silient on merge r activity. One re ason could be t h at most banking states only allowed u ni t b ranch banking and merging would be unlikely option . equation (5 ) into (7), we find that net entry rate i s equal to
Thus , t h e model predi cts that n et e n try is a positive function of deposi ts, r egion a l deposits, and inverse l y rel at e d to the rat e of r e turn on alte rnat i ve i nvestme nt s , the fa i lure rate in the banking market, lagged capi tal , and t h e growth bank .
IV. Data and. Estimation Techniques capi tal per
Equations ( 5) and ( 8) p rovide t he bc::i.s is of t he empirical analysis. Bank data were compiled from t h e various s t a t e bank c onditi on. r e ports. 14 From t h e condition report.s , entry and exi t data were cal c u lated . In some cases , individual banks that h ad reported in the pas t were not listed on t h e bank cond it i on report for a particular year a nd the n s howed up on the repor t t h e following y ear. Since t h e b a nk continued in operation during the period , the condition report was adjusted to reflect its ope rati ons .
Whe n non -reporti ng b a nk s were found, adjustments were made to the tot.al number of banks ope rating, total bank cap i t al , deposi t s a nd banknot es. It was assumed that t h e bank's capital ,,.
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Since the change i n capital is a stochastic variabl e , t h e sub s titution of equation (5) When us i ng h istorical data, insufficient sampl e si ze s often pre clude econometric testing . Given a sample of t w·enty -two s ta t es wi t h observations ranging from ten to seventeen, we are able to overcome t his obstacl e a nd e nj oy advantages associated wi t h panel da t a . The increa sed efficiency due to greater degrees of freedom do no t , h owever, come wi t h ou t a co st . The econometr i c difficul ti es inh e rent i n both time s e ries a nd cros s sectional dat a , aut ocorre l a t ion and h eterosc e dasticity, mu st be addres s ed . In our sample , we h ad sev eral pe r iods where the failure rate was zero. In order to ma intain sample size, we did not log the failur e rate .
wh ich tak es on the value of 1 for any y e ar a free banking l aw is in effect and zero oth erwise . FREE3Y takes o n the v alue of one only during t he firs t three years of a state's free banking period , and ze ro o t h erwise which enables us to examine t h e initial struc t u ra l c hanges caused by e n act ing free banking l a ws.
Some estimations requi re the use of t h e s tat e dummy variables .
We expec t the signs of t he adjus tment coeffi cient (L) would be different unde r different banking regimes. If a s t a te allows capi tal to f low fr ee ly i n to the market, we would expec t bank s to be res pon siv e to t h e chan ges in t h e demand for bank capi tal.
Capital would move rapidly to desire d l e vel s , a nd t h e coeff icie n t of adjustment (L) woul d be close to one . However , if t here are restri ctions to t h e f l ow of capital, s u c h as l egislative lags to
n e w e ntry, or underc ap italiztion of n e w e n trants , t h en t h e ad justment proce s s would be muc h slower and t h e coeffi cien t of a djustmen t woul d be c loser to zero. 17 Likewise , a prio ri , the responsiveness of capital formation to lroad retur:n and r egional deposits is expected to be s maller in the r estricted entry system . After 1851 or after t h e e nactment of the free banking, we would expect a n i ncrea se in capital l e v els indica ted Table 3 . ) It appears that the model was a b le to exp l 63% of t h e variation 6lnC in t h e PFBS whi le the model was abl e to explain less t h an 43 % and 31% of the v ariation in t h e CS and PCS, r espe ctively.
In the PFBS, it appears t h at the se states responded more quickly to c h a nges in desire d capital t h an eith er the PCS o r CS.
A o ne percen t increase in desire d capital re s ulted in a 49% increase in ac tual capital, almos t h alf the desired amount. In t h e PCS and t h e CS , t he r espon se was less t h an half of t h e PFBS We trie d t he dummy v ar iable -interaction approach to t est signi fi can t differenc e s . Th e res ul t prod uc e questionabl e results.
Al t hough t h e R 2
was hig h er , many of t h e v ariables were statist ica l ly ins igni fica n t. Th i s suggests seve r e mul ticol linearity .
figure: bo t h the PCS a nd CS i ncreas ed actual capi tal by 21%.
This suggests t ha t t h ere may h ave b ee n more barrie rs to the entry of capital in PCS a nd t he CS .
Regional deposi ts had no influe nce in the PCS a n d CS, wh il e a n e gative luence i n t he rate of capital accumulation in t h e PFBS. When regional deposits decline by one pe rcent , the fr ee banking states would initial ly increase in -state capital levels by . 14%, a nd in t he long -run by .27%. 20 Th i s n egative effect indi cates t h at Pure Free Banking St ates were more r esponsive to regiona l eco:nornic conditions .
As expected, t h e r esults indi cate t h at capital flow s i n to
t h e banking s y s tems we r e n egatively re lated to railroad returns.
These r eturns, however , were stat i stically insignifi can t for PCS a nd CS , whi le the y we re statistically significant for t h e PFBS .
. An increase i n t:: h e total return to :L"ailroad stoc k: :r:·esul ted a sligh t reduction of t h e ra t e of capital accumulation, . 07% .
Likewise, the PFBS were much more se n sitive t o changes in d epos its tha n the PCS and CS. In the s hort run, a one percent increase in deposits resu lted in .57% increase i n capital in the PFBS , a .14% increase in PCS and an .8 % increase CS. In t h e long run , PFBS inc r ease capi t a l by 1 . 1 6% , t h e PCS increase capital by .67%, a n d CS increase capi tal by .38% . This sugges ts th.at i n t h e l o ng run bank s in t h e PFBS were increasing capi t al levels in order to maintain t heir financial leverage, but banks 20
The l ong -r un e lasticity is calculat ed by dividing the coefficien t of each variable by the coeffic i e nt of a djustmen t.
in the PCS and CS increase their financial leverage in t he long run. This increase in financial leverage impl s that PCS and CS were able t o increase the produc tion of loans without additional support from stock.holders.
When we examine t he coeffic i ents o n the failure rate , we find that our results cover the range o:f outcomes : the failure rate was n egat ive and significant in PCS, and positive and significant in the CS and PFBS. One could explain the negative results in the PCS by the entry process . Perhaps, legislators in PCS restricted entry when bank failures occurred in t heir states whil e entrepreneurs in CS and PFBS were willing to enter when bank. failures occurred. l\.pparent ly, in PFBS and CS bank failures did not increase expected risk to pote n t ial entrants .
The results in Table 3 also answer t wo key questions, did the PCS change their behavior after 1851 when many of the states enacted fre e banking laws and did the CS change their behavior after the e n ac tment of t he free banking laws? The answers to t hese question s are fou nd by examining t he coefficients o n the TIME and FREE dummy variables. TIME 3Y a:nd TIME have t he expected positive sign, but they are statistical l y insignificant. Thus, there was n o increas e in t h e tre nd rate of change to capital in the PCS in ei ther the short -run or t he long -run.
In the CS we f ind that there wa s a significant increase in t h e trend rate of change to capital in both the short -run and long-run; both FREE 3Y a nd FREE are positive and stat isticall y significant. Duri ng the three year period after the e n actment of t h e free bank i ng laws, the rate of capital accumulati on rose on average by . . 04% per yea r , a nd d u ring t he e ntire period the rate of capital accumulation rose b y .09% per year.
In summary, the competitive model indi cates that capital accumulation was r es tric t ive in t he Pure Chartering St.a t es . . In the Ch a ngeover State s , the results s h owe d a "liberalization" in b e havior after the enactment of t he fr ee bankin g laws.. After free banking laws are e nact ed , the rate of capital accumulation i n cre ased at a faste r pace. Pure Free Banking States showed the greatest sensitivi t y to t h e detenninants of desired capital, a nd t h e largest coeffic ient of adjusbnent . .
VI . Bank Ent r y Result.s
The capital forrrBtion results s uggest that the rat e of capit al formation ma y have accelera ted after 1851. If the ent:ry of capital was due to lower barriers to new entrants, we would expect that the n e t ent ry rate woul d have increased during the same period . We examine this quest ion us ing the n et e ntry model
given by equation (8) :
NER 1 r, = LlnB0 + LB 11nRR, + LB2 lnDRp + LB.,FR 1 , + LA1 D 1 , _ 1 I.lnC;, .i + FL,PERS :i t + BGT IME; 1 + B.,TIME3Y 1 ' -+ B.,F'REE;c + B9 FREE3Y; 1 + B10 ,,,Stat e 1 ·t E; 1 • Net entry i s expe cted to be positively related to the regional d e p os its, deposits, and negatively re lated to the r etu rn o n railroad st ock a nd percen tage change in ave rage capi t al size.
Moreover, we can make infere n ces regarding t h e rrBgnitude of ce r tain coefficien ts . Whe n comparing r es t ctive versus non 20 restrictive bank markets , differences in the magnitude of certain coef ficients should be evident. For t he mark ets tha.t rest ricte d e n t ry we would expect t hat net e ntry woul d be less responsive to regional depos its, deposits, and fai lure rates due t o t h e slower legi slative process.
The coefficie nt s on the dummy variable s , FREE3 Y, FREE and TIME3Y and TIME, are expec ted to be po si tive. If barriers t o entry were reduced after t h e free banking l a ws , CS s h ould s h ow a increase in net entry after the laws were enacted . If PCS 11 l i b era.lized n chartering p olic s, TIME3Y and TIME should show an increase in net e nt ry after 1851 .
The results of Net En t ry regre s sion s are g in Table 4 .
As exp e cted , t h e n et e ntry rate increased in t h e PCS between 1852 a nd 1854 by an a v erage of 6 . 3%. Thi s increase , however , was no t sus t ained for the whole period. The PCS showe d an increase of 4 . 3% for the whole period , but t hi s result is statistically insign ificant . In CS state s, n et entry increased by an average of 7.3% p er year during t h e firs t three y ears of free banking and by a 12 .8% increase per y ear for the e ntire p eriod of free b anking. I t is clear t h at the CS lowered bar riers to e n try, wh ile i t is u n clear t hat PCS reduced barri ers to e n try . It appe ars that PCS ma y have r e acted to tial c h anges i n t he niarket and liberalized e n try whe n many free bankins3 laws were enacted, but t his policy wa s n ot sustained throughou t t h e period .
The CS also a p peared to b e more willing t o increase the number of competitors t han t h e PCS to changes in d esired capital, th.ough l ess wi ll ing t han PFBS . An increase in desired capital of 1% resu l t ed in a n increase in ne t entry of . 49 % i n PFBS, .30% in CS and only . 18% in PCS. The responses of PFBS a nd CS were quicke r than PCS.
In l igh t of t h e capital formation results , the CS were just as slow to bring actual capital fl ows up to desired capital flows in t he system as PCS, bu t t h ey were more willing to allow n e w entrants into t he market . Thi s s uggests that t h e PCS were willing to increase t h e average capital size per bank ra ther than increase the number of compe titors, wherea s t he CS were more willi ng to increase t he number of competitors wh ile maintaining average capital size.
This assertion i s con firmed , in part , when we examine the impact of average capital size on t h e rate of net ent ry. We find that capi t al r bank had a smaller i mpac t on the n et e ntry rate in PCS than CS. A 1% growth in capital per bank resu lted in only a .33% decline in the net e n try rate in PCS whe r e as a 1% growth in capital per bank resulted in a . 74% decline in CS.
This implies t hat in PCS bank per capita growth of 3% would redu ce the number of compe titors by 1% wr1ereas in CS bank per capita growth of 1.4% would reduce the number of competitors by 1% . Thus, it appears t h a t individual banks in t h e PCS mark et coul d grow in size wi t hout :Eorciw::J or redu cing competitors out of t he market, whereas the growth of individual banks in the CS mark et appeared to h ave a mu ch more signific a n t impact o n market compe t itors.
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The ot h er det erminan ts of net e ntry led to interest i ng results . Regional deposits h a d litt le impact on t h e n et entry rat e in t wo banking markets, but we r e signif icant in the PFBS .
These r esult s a r e similar to those found t he capital formation model s u ggesting that out-of -state market for ces we re i n fluenci ng capital flows a nd b ank formation in t h e PFBS.
All three markets respo nded to c h a nges i n d eposits : both t h e PCS and t h e CS s howed a .09% to .1% increase in t h e net e n try rate f rom a n 1% increase in d eposits, whil e PFBS showe d a .49%
increase the n et e n try rat e . In t h e case of the PCS, a n increase i n t h e fai lure ra te of one percent reduced t h e n et entry r ate by .9% wherea s i n t h e CS it inc reased the net entry rat e by .59% .
It appears t h at the fail u re r ate h ad no infl ue nce on n et e n try in t b.e PFRS .
I n summary, it a ppears tha t bank entry act ty increased in both the Changeover States and Pure Ch artering State durin g the enactment of t h e free banking l aws. This e n try con ti nue d t h roughout the fr ee banking pe riod in the Change over States , but was curtailed in t h e Pure Chartering States three years after n e ighoring states e n acted free banki n g laws. Like wi se , t he Pure
Charte ring States h a d t h e slowest rat e o f adjustmment i ndi cating t h e mo st restr ictive e ntry policy compared to e ither the cbangeovers or Pu re Free Banking States.
VII CONCLUSION
The e vidence s u ggests t h a t s tate s e nac t ing free banking laws lowered barrie rs t o e n try as measured by t h e increases in t h e n e t e n try rate and capital formation . b Total number represents total net entrants which is calculated by subtracting the highest total number of banks operating in the period from the number of banks operating in 1851.
c Virginia is technically a charter state although chartering policy was no different than a free banking state.
d Michigan enacted the first free banking law in March of 1837. The influx of new entrants and the gross mismangement of the owners forced the legislature to repeal the law in April, 1838. The number of charters represents the minimum number of banks that were issued prior to the enactment of the second free banking law.
e Total entrants include banks that entered under the limited free banking and the free banking law. 
